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Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
Ulrich Berger
WU Vienna, Department of Economics, Augasse 2-6, 1090 Wien, Austria
Abstract
Cooperating in the Prisoner’s Dilemma is irrational and some supporting mecha-
nism is needed to stabilize cooperation. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is
one such mechanism. Assessing an individual’s reputation requires first-order infor-
mation, i.e. knowledge about its previous behavior, as it is utilized under image
scoring. But there seems to be an agreement that in order to successfully stabilize
cooperation, higher-order information is necessary, i.e. knowledge of others’ previ-
ous reputations. We show here that such a conclusion might have been premature.
Tolerant scoring, a first-order assessment rule with built-in tolerance against single
defections, can lead a society to stable cooperation.
Key words: Evolution; Cooperation; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Indirect reciprocity;
Scoring rule; First-order information
1 Introduction
1.1 Indirect reciprocity
Cooperation is ubiquitous in economic life, but in its purest form it is nei-
ther rational nor evolutionarily stable. Cooperating by acting altruistically
and helping those in need reduces the actor’s payoff while it increases the
recipient’s payoff. Such a behavior, while socially desirable, is dominated by
defection, as the paradigm of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game teaches us. Sus-
tainable cooperation requires a supporting mechanism, i.e. a framework which
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transforms the basic game into a situation where the dilemma vanishes. Sev-
eral such mechanisms are known—see Nowak (2006) for a recent review—and
among those, indirect reciprocity has recently received increasing attention.
Like direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity (Trivers, 1971, Sugden, 1986, Alexan-
der, 1987) relies on the idea that the probability of receiving help is higher
for those who helped in the past. However, under indirect reciprocity helpful
acts are not returned by the receivers of these acts but by third parties. 2 This
requires that individuals carry an observable reputation which is informative
about their past behavior. From Kandori (1992) and Okuno-Fujiwara and
Postlewaite (1995) to Takahashi (2010), work on repeated games with ran-
dom matching has demonstrated that under these assumptions, community
enforcement has the potential to uphold equilibrium cooperation as a social
norm in a group of forward-looking rational agents. Likewise, evolutionary
approaches have shown that discriminators who base their decision whether
or not to help on the potential recipient’s reputation have the chance to sur-
vive or even spread in populations of unconditional cooperators and defectors.
Since Nowak and Sigmund (1998a, 1998b) first presented a formal evolution-
ary model, a variety of specific rules for indirect reciprocity have been studied
in detail. Our own approach starts with a critical evaluation of this very first
model.
1.2 Image scoring
Under the image scoring mechanism (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a, 1998b,
Lotem et al, 1999), each individual is equipped with a numerical score which
measures its past cooperativeness by counting how often it helped on its last
interactions. In the simplest case, scoring is binary and discriminators assess
other individuals as either Good or Bad, depending on whether or not they
helped on their last interaction. Upon meeting an individual, discriminators
then help those and only those which they assessed as Good. Scoring is called
a first-order assessment rule, since in assessing an individual, i.e. in updating
this individual’s reputation, it relies only on the focal individual’s behavior
towards its partner, but neither on this partner’s reputation nor on the focal
individual’s previous reputation.
Under binary scoring, discriminators cannot be exploited by unconditional de-
fectors, since they will never give help to those. While this sounds promising
for the sustainability of cooperation in a population made up of cooperators,
defectors, and discriminators, there are two subtle problems. These are associ-
ated with two terms Axelrod (1984) used to characterize successful strategies
in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
2 Binmore (1992) called this the I-won’t-scratch-your-back-if-you-won’t-scratch-
their-backs principle and traced it to David Hume.
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• The “niceness problem”: Discriminators are “nice” in the sense that they
never exploit unconditional cooperators, since the latter are assessed as
Good. But this means that in the absence of defectors, discriminators and
cooperators are behaviorally indistinguishable. Both cooperate on each in-
teraction and receive the same payoff. As a consequence, discrimination is
not evolutionarily stable and neutral drift or random fluctuations might
drive such a population to a state where unconditional cooperators abound.
Thereafter, as soon as experiments or mutations reintroduce defectors into
the population, these can exploit the large number of cooperators, thereby
collect high payoffs and finally overtake the population.
• The “provocability problem”: Discriminators are “provocable” since they re-
act to an observed defection by defecting themselves. While this behavior
seems to be necessary to avoid exploitation by defectors, it has a conse-
quence which is detrimental for the success of discriminators. A discrimi-
nator who punishes a defector by withholding help is itself assessed as Bad
and hence being punished by defection if he meets another discriminator
thereafter. The reason is that under image scoring, discriminators do not
distinguish between “justified” and “unjustified” defections. As a result, the
presence of a few defectors can trigger a wave of cannibalism among discrim-
inators, which lowers their payoffs and makes them increasingly vulnerable.
Note that in the presence of errors in implementing cooperation, provocabil-
ity even exacerbates the niceness problem. If a population of discriminators is
subjected to a small rate of involuntary defections, these defections are pun-
ished by withholding help, which increases the rate of defection even further.
A single cooperator entering such a population then has a higher probability
of receiving help than a discriminator, which results in a payoff advantage en-
abling cooperators to invade the discriminator population even without relying
on neutral drift.
These problems with the image scoring mechanism and their implications have
been laid out in the literature during the last couple of years. It is now generally
accepted that under image scoring, the discriminator strategy can survive in
the population for some time but is bound to get extinct in the long run,
see Panchanathan and Boyd (2003), Ohtsuki (2004), or Brandt and Sigmund
(2006). While image scoring behavior in humans is supported by experimental
research, 3 it remained unclear how it might be able to evolve or stabilize. 4
1.3 Higher-order information
In overcoming the problems associated with image scoring, researchers have
turned to more sophisticated, second-order and third-order assessment rules
3 E.g. Wedekind and Milinski (2000), Milinski et al (2001), Bolton et al (2005), or
Seinen and Schram (2006).
4 For a review see Nowak and Sigmund (2005).
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for binary reputations. 5 The primary focus of this literature has been to
study assessment rules which are able to distinguish between “justified” and
“unjustified” defections, thereby alleviating the provocability problem noted
above.
For example, when assessing an individual’s behavior based on its last action
chosen, Sugden’s (1986) standing rule takes into account the reputation of this
individual’s opponent. Under this rule, cooperation makes you Good, and de-
fection against a Good individual makes you Bad, but defecting against a Bad
opponent is viewed as justified and does not change your current reputation.
While the standing rule as well as several other higher-order assessment rules
have been found to render discrimination evolutionarily stable, 6 those rules
suffer from being informationally and cognitively extremely demanding as well
as having weak experimental support (Milinski et al, 2001). This makes it
somewhat questionable if they can provide a rationale for the evolution of
indirect reciprocity.
1.4 Tolerant scoring
In this paper we choose a different route. Instead of trying to completely avoid
the provocability problem by introducing higher-order information, we stick
to a simple assessment rule of the scoring type requiring only first-order in-
formation. However, we reduce the intensity of the provocability problem by
increasing the amount of information provided on individuals’ past behavior.
To be precise, we assume that in assessing his opponent a discriminator sam-
ples two actions from its past. Then the discriminator views the opponent as
Good (and therefore cooperates) if and only if the opponent has helped at least
once in these two actions. We call this rule tolerant scoring, since it tolerates a
single defection, and distinguish it from Nowak and Sigmund’s (1998b) binary
scoring model by referring to the latter as simple scoring. The relationship be-
tween simple scoring and tolerant scoring may be viewed as analogous to the
relationship between Tit-for-Tat and the Tit-for-Two-Tats strategy Axelrod
(1984) devised for the second of his computer tournaments.
Note that sampling two instead of only one action from the opponent’s past
increases the amount of information available, but it still remains first-order
information. No knowledge about reputation or the actions of the focal oppo-
nent’s previous opponents is involved. Sampling two actions from an individ-
ual’s past behavior may be viewed as remembering having directly watched
these past interactions or, alternatively, as having gathered this information
5 E.g. Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), Ohtsuki (2004), Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004),
Brandt and Sigmund (2004), Chalub et al (2006), and Pacheco et al (2006).
6 See Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2006, 2007), Ohtsuki et al (2009), Uchida and Sigmund
(2010).
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indirectly by asking around.
Obviously, under tolerant scoring discriminators are considerably less provo-
cable than under simple scoring. By tolerating a single defection, they are less
likely to punish other discriminators who defected previously. To illustrate
this, consider an overall defection rate of, say, 0.1 among discriminators. Un-
der simple scoring this induces a ten percent probability for a discriminator of
being punished when meeting its own kind. Under tolerant scoring, however,
this probability is squared to one percent. At the same time, discriminators
remain immune to exploitation by defectors, since defectors never help and
are therefore always punished by discriminators. So discriminators using tol-
erant scoring have at least the potential to survive in a world of unconditional
cooperators and defectors. Indeed we show here that under tolerant scoring
discrimination is a strict Nash equilibrium and hence evolutionarily stable for
small positive error rates. Even more, it turns out that under the best-response
dynamics almost fully cooperative discrimination can become established from
arbitrary inital conditions.
2 Model
2.1 The donation game, errors, and reputations
Consider a large population of infinitely-lived individuals. Time τ is continuous
and individuals are repeatedly and randomly matched in pairs to interact in
the donation game. During each interaction, one individual is randomly chosen
to be the donor and the other to be the receiver. Donors can either give help
(cooperate, C) or not (defect,D) to the receiver. Helping decreases the donor’s
payoff by an amount c and increases the receiver’s payoff by b, where b >
c > 0. For convenience we will make the usual assumption that actually each
individual plays in both roles at the same time during an interaction. With a
small probability α > 0 a donor who intends to cooperate is not able to do so
(e.g. due to lack of resources) and instead defects. With probability α¯ = 1−α
an intended cooperation is implemented correctly. No implementation errors
are assumed if a donor intends to defect.
Before the donor implements his action, he is informed of (“recalls”) the out-
come of two past interactions where the current receiver was in the role of a
donor. Those two interactions are sampled independently from the receiver’s
past behavior. 7 The reputation the donor assigns to the receiver depends on
the number of helping acts (C’s), and the receiver is assessed by the donor as
Good if he helped on one or both occasions and as Bad if he defected in both
7 For technical simplicity we assume sampling with replacement. While this makes
it possible that the two past actions sampled are one and the same, it doesn’t change
the results.
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interactions.
2.2 Strategies and population dynamics
We study the following three pure strategies:
• Cooperators always (intend to) cooperate. This strategy is called AllC as
usual. Its frequency is denoted by x.
• Defectors always defect. This is the AllD strategy with frequency y.
• Discriminators (intend to) cooperate if and only if the opponent’s reputation
is assessed as Good. This strategy is denoted by Disc and has frequency z.
Since indirect reciprocity has predominantly been studied in the biological
literature, changes in strategy frequencies have usually been interpreted as
resulting from evolutionary forces and consequently been modeled by replica-
tor dynamics. However, in the context of human behavior we find it at least
equally reasonable to posit a basic version of bounded rationality and therefore
assume that strategy updating is guided by the learning dynamics known as
the best-response dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991, Matsui, 1992, see also
Hofbauer, 2000 and Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). 8 Under the best-response
dynamics, individuals are chosen every now and then to update their strategy
choice. Updating individuals choose a myopic pure best response to the cur-
rent population state. This results in the population state (x(τ), y(τ), z(τ))
moving along (possibly non-unique) solutions of the differential inclusion
(x˙, y˙, z˙) ∈ B(x, y, z)− (x, y, z), (1)
where B(x, y, z) is the set of (pure or mixed) best responses to the strategy
profile (x, y, z). As long as the best responses are unique, the population state
moves along a straight line pointing to the current pure best response.
2.3 Reputation dynamics
Changes of strategy frequencies are due to differential payoffs, which depend on
individuals’ reputations. But reputations influence behavior and are therefore
themselves subject to change. We assume here the existence of two different
time-scales. Learning via the best-response dynamics occurs on a slow time
scale τ , while reputation dynamics occur on a discrete and fast time-scale t.
We show below that reputations always converge to an equilibrium and it is
therefore justified to treat reputation as instantly equilibrated when deriving
the payoffs which determine the learning dynamics on the slow time-scale.
So let us assume for a moment that the population state (x, y, z) is fixed and
8 The choice of dynamics does not change our results qualitatively, however.
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interactions occur at discrete time steps t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Let the initial two
moves at t = 0 and t = 1 for a cooperator be C,C, for a defector D,D,
and for a discriminator two arbitrary moves. For any time t0 ≥ 2 the past
of an individual at time t0 is defined as its sequence of chosen actions during
0 ≤ t ≤ t0−1. We assume that when sampling two past moves of an individual,
errors in perception do not occur. However, assessments of the same individual
may of course differ across assessors, since sampling makes an individual’s
reputation a random variable—reputation is in the eye of the beholder. 9
The helping probability of defectors is always zero. The helping probability of
cooperators depends only on the error rate and is given by α¯, independently of
the population state. For discriminators the situation is more difficult. Their
helping probability is subject to dynamic change. Discriminators help if they
assess their opponent as Good, the probability of which depends on the average
cooperation rate during the opponent’s past. This average past helping rate
can in turn be derived from the population state (x, y, z), the error rate α
and the sequence of discriminators’ current helping probabilities. At time t the
current helping probability of discriminators, denoted by pt, is defined as the
probability that a randomly chosen discriminator plays a C at time t. We show
in the appendix that pt always converges to a limit value p, which determines
the reputation equilibrium.
In reputation equilibrium, the discriminators’ helping probability p turns out
to be implicitly given by
p = α¯[(1− α2)x+ p(2− p)z]. (2)
To see this, note that a discriminator intends to help if he meets a cooperator
(probability x) who has not erroneously defected twice (probability 1−α2) or
if he meets another discriminator (probability z) who has not defected in both
instances (probability 1− (1− p2) = p(2− p)). Finally, intended cooperation
succeeds with probability α¯.
Thus, a discriminator’s helping probability can be calculated as
p =

α¯(1− α2)x . . . z = 0
1− 1
2α¯z
+
√(
1− 1
2α¯z
)2
+ (1− α2)x
z
. . . z > 0

(3)
Note that in the absence of cooperators, i.e. for x = 0, the expression for p
reduces to
9 With the obvious exception of defectors, who will always be assessed as Bad.
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x = 0⇒ p =

0 . . . z ≤ 1
2α¯
2− 1
α¯z
. . . z > 1
2α¯

(4)
2.4 Payoffs
Given a reputation equilibrium determined by p, the cooperation and defection
probabilities of the three strategies as well as their probability of being assessed
as Good by a Discriminator are given by
strategy coop. prob. defection prob. prob. of Good assessment
AllC α¯ α 1− α2
AllD 0 1 0
Disc p 1− p 1− (1− p)2 = p(2− p)
This allows us to write down the probability-matrix of an S-strategist’s prob-
ability q(S, T ) of intending to help a T -strategist.
q(S, T ) AllC AllD Disc
AllC 1 1 1
AllD 0 0 0
Disc 1− α2 0 p(2− p)
From this probability-matrix we can finally derive the payoff-matrix. To do
this, note that due to the possibility of errors, an S-strategist’s probability
of actually helping a T -strategist is α¯q(S, T ) and the S-strategist’s payoff
therefore is
Π¯(S, T ) = α¯[bq(T, S)− cq(S, T )]. (5)
Dividing by the strictly positive factor α¯ and inserting from the probability-
matrix leads to the payoff-matrix Π(S, T ) = 1
α¯
Π¯(S, T ), given by
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Π =
AllC AllD Disc
AllC b− c −c (1− α2)b− c
AllD b 0 0
Disc b− (1− α2)c 0 p(2− p)(b− c)
(6)
Note that this payoff-matrix is state-dependent, since p depends on the pop-
ulation state (x, y, z) via (3).
2.5 Best response regions
2.5.1 Vanishing error rate
Let us start with the case α = 0. In this case the payoffs reduce to
Π0 =
AllC AllD Disc
AllC b− c −c b− c
AllD b 0 0
Disc b− c 0 p(2− p)(b− c)
(7)
where p = 1 − 1
2z
+
√(
1− 1
2z
)2
+ x
z
for z > 0 and p = x for z = 0. From
equations (3) and (4), on the AllC-Disc edge {y = 0} we have p = 1 and on
the AllD-Disc edge {x = 0} we have p = 0 for z ≤ 1
2
and p = 2− 1
z
for z > 1
2
.
Substituting for p in the payoff matrix, we can determine the best response
to any population state mixture (x, y, z) with x > 0 by computing the vector
of expected payoffs Π0 · (x, y, z)T and comparing the components. This results
in the following best response regions for x > 0:
• AllD is a best response if and only if z ≤ c(b−c)
2b(b−c)−b2x .
• AllC is a best response if and only if (y = 0 and z ≥ c
b
) or x ≤ (z−
c
b)(
b−c
b
−z)
z
.
• Disc is a best response if and only if x ≥ (z−
c
b)(
b−c
b
−z)
z
and z ≥ c(b−c)
2b(b−c)−b2x .
It follows that on the edge {y = 0}, both AllC and Disc are best responses
for z ≥ c
b
. This implies that the edge-segment Nxz = {y = 0, z ≥ cb} is a
component of Nash equilibria for α = 0.
Remember from equation (4) that in the absence of cooperators the coopera-
tion rate vanishes once more than one half of the population is comprised of de-
fectors. On the edge {x = 0}, therefore, both AllD andDisc are best responses
whenever z ≤ 1
2
and z ≤ c
b
and z ≤ 1− c
b
, i.e. whenever z ≤ min{1− c
b
, c
b
}. This
edge-segment therefore constitutes a second component of Nash equilibria we
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All C All D 
Disc 
Nyz 
Nxz 
B = {Disc}
B = {All D}
B = {All C}
 
Fig. 1. Interior best-response regions and Nash equilibrium components for α = 0
and b = 3c.
denote by Nyz. Disc is also a best response on the segment z ≥ max{ cb , 1− cb}.
If b > 2c, then there is an intermediate region c
b
≤ z ≤ 1− c
b
, where AllC has
the highest payoff. The best-response regions and Nash equilibrium compo-
nents are shown in Figure 1.
2.5.2 Positive error rate
If we go from α = 0 to a small positive error rate α > 0, then continuity of
payoffs in α implies that the best response regions in the interior of the state
space change only little. This holds also for the best response regions on the
AllD-Disc edge {x = 0}, where the Nash equilibrium component Nyz now
extends over the range z ≤ min{1− c
(1−α2)b ,
c
(1−α2)b}.
Writing the payoff difference between discriminators and cooperators at the
population state (x, y, z) as δ(x, y, z) = Π(Disc)−Π(AllC), we can calculate
the payoff difference ∆ at the AllC-Disc edge as ∆ := δ(1− z, 0, z) = α2[zb+
(1− z)c]− z(b− c)(1− p)2.
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Denoting by ∆′ and p′ the derivatives with respect to α, from equation (2) it
follows that p′ = −[(1−α2)x+p(2−p)z]+2α¯[p′(1−p)z−αx] and since α = 0
implies p = 1 at the AllC-Disc edge, p′|α=0 = −1 for x = 1− z. We can also
calculate ∆′ = 2α[zb+(1−z)c]+2z(b−c)(1−p)p′ and ∆′′ = 2[zb+(1−z)c]+
2z(b − c)[(1 − p)p′′ − p′2]. Substituting α = 0, p = 1, and p′|α=0 = −1 yields
∆|α=0 = ∆′|α=0 = 0 and ∆′′|α=0 = 2c > 0. A second-order Taylor expansion
of ∆ in the error rate α therefore shows that ∆ > 0 for small α > 0, implying
that on the AllC-Disc edge discriminators outcompete cooperators for small
positive error rates. In this case the Nash equilibrium component Nxz collapses
to a single and strict Nash equilibrium at the Disc-vertex. This proves that
the Disc strategy is evolutionarily stable. The equilibrium cooperation rate is
given by p = 2− 1
α¯
= 1−2α
1−α , which is close to full cooperation for a small error
rate.
The best response regions for α > 0 are depicted in Figure 2 for the case b = 3c.
From this figure we can also derive the dynamic properties of population-level
learning. In the region where discriminators earn the highest payoff, solutions
of the best-response dynamics head straight towards the Disc-vertex. For a set
of initial points near the Nash equilibrium component, solutions run into the
boundary of the hump-shaped best response region of AllC. Those solutions
then wander upwards along the boundary until they can continue to move
along a straight line and converge to the Disc-vertex.
Any solution starting in the AllD best response region in the interior of the
state space converges along a straight line towards the AllD-vertex. Note, how-
ever, that the AllD-vertex itself lies within a component of Nash equilibria and
is therefore not evolutionarily stable. Indeed, starting from the AllD-vertex,
there exist solutions which travel along the Nash equilibrium component until
they enter the best response region of AllC, following the hump-shaped bound-
ary of this region upwards and finally heading off towards the discriminator
vertex.
3 Discussion
In the presence of implementation errors tolerant scoring makes both the “nice-
ness problem” and the “provocability problem” disappear. A small level of
noise leads to slightly different cooperation rates among discriminators and
cooperators, even in the absence of defectors. Discrimination then results in
a higher payoff and cooperators cannot invade. At the same time, tolerance
against single defections greatly reduces provocability of discriminators among
its own kind, but does not diminish its strength against unconditional defec-
tors.
We have seen that a low initial level of discriminators may lead to the dis-
appearance of both cooperators and discriminators, but as soon as uncondi-
11
 All C All D 
Disc 
Nyz 
Fig. 2. Best-response dynamics for tolerant scoring. Here a small positive error rate
is assumed and the case b = 3c is shown. Within the Nash equilibrium component
Nyz the direction of movement is indetermined.
tional cooperation vanishes and everyone defects, the discriminating strategy
no longer suffers from a payoff disadvantage and individuals may (but need
not) return to discrimination, offering the possibility that in the long run the
whole society learns to effectively discriminate. So discrimination is not only
a strict and therefore locally attracting Nash equilibrium, but may finally be
learned from arbitrary initial conditions.
It seems plausible that the discriminating strategy should carry additional
cognitive costs as compared to the two unconditional strategies. Clearly, the
introduction of such a cost would result in defection being evolutionarily sta-
ble. But since discrimination is a strict Nash equilibrium, it would still remain
strict as long as the costs are small enough. Thus, evolutionary stability of
discrimination is robust to the introduction of small cognitive costs.
We stress that tolerance is the key to successful cooperation in our model.
Previous cooperation is rewarded by discriminators through helping. A single
defection is tolerated, but not two defections. This allows discriminators to
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strike a balance between being too lenient, which leads to exploitation by
defectors, and being too rigid, which results in mutual punishment within
its own kind. This middle course requires three distinct types of observable
behavior. Checking only a single instance of an individual’s past behavior
seems to provide too coarse a measure to build a working reputation system
on.
Double-checking her deeds before judging a person’s character is not an un-
realistic requirement for a basic reputation system. But the prime advantage
of tolerant scoring is that the cognitive and informational load it puts on its
subjects is considerably lower than the one of higher-order assessment rules.
For the evolution of cooperation via indirect reciprocity this makes tolerant
scoring a promising alternative rule.
Appendix
By definition, pt = α¯Gt, where Gt is the probability of assessing an opponent
as Good at time t. Let gz(t) denote the probability that a randomly chosen
discriminator is assessed as Good at time t. Then Gt = (1−α2)x+0y+gz(t)z
and substituting yields
pt = α¯[x(1− α2) + zgz(t)].
Next, let at denote the average past helping frequency of a tolerant discrim-
inator at time t, i.e. the probability that a randomly chosen past move of a
randomly chosen discriminator is a C. If the expected number of C’s in the
past is ct, then at = ct/t. Hence gz(t) = 1 − (1 − at)2, or gz(t) = at(2 − at),
and we can write
pt = α¯[(1− α2)x+ at(2− at)z].
In round t+ 1, let the discriminator’s move be m ∈ {C,D}. Then m = D ⇒
at+1 =
ct+1
t+1
= ct
t+1
= t
t+1
at and m = C ⇒ at+1 = ct+1t+1 = ct+1t+1 = tt+1at+ 1t+1 . The
probability for a cooperative move at time t is pt, hence at+1 =
t
t+1
at +
1
t+1
pt
and inserting from above yields
at+1 =
t
t+ 1
at +
1
t+ 1
α¯[(1− α2)x+ at(2− at)z].
We show now that the sequence (at) of average past helping frequencies always
converges. To see this, note that in the absence of discriminators, i.e. for z = 0,
the sequence converges to α¯(1−α2)x. If z > 0 and x > 0, then there is a unique
fixed point a, which is implicitly given by a = α¯[(1 − α2)x + a(2 − a)z] and
can be calculated as
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a = 1− 1
2α¯z
+
√(
1− 1
2α¯z
)2
+ (1− α2)x
z
.
The sequence (at) gives rise to the sequence (pt) of current helping probabilities
with a unique fixed point p. Note that at the fixed point the current helping
probability equals the average past helping frequency, i.e. p = a.
For fixed t we can consider pt as a function of at. It is easy to see that for
z > 0 this function is strictly increasing, rising from α¯(1− α2)x for at = 0 to
α¯(1−α2)x+ α¯z for at = 1, and crossing the diagonal at pt = at = a. It follows
that for x > 0,
at < a⇒ at < pt < a⇒ at < at+1 < a
and
at > a⇒ at > pt > a⇒ at > at+1 > a.
Therefore, if x > 0, at converges monotonically to a from any initial value.
The same holds for the sequence pt, so for x > 0 and z > 0 the tolerant
discriminators’ helping probability converges to
p = 1− 1
2α¯z
+
√(
1− 1
2α¯z
)2
+ (1− α2)x
z
.
If there are no cooperators, i.e. if x = 0, then aˆ = 0 is a fixed point of the
sequence (at). If z >
1
2α¯
, then this fixed point is a repellor and at converges
to a = 2(1 − (2α¯z)−1) > 0. However, if z ≤ 1
2α¯
, then a = aˆ = 0. This unique
fixed point is attracting and cooperation disappears completely. For the AllD-
Disc edge this means that Disc has a payoff advantage whenever it is already
sufficiently frequent, viz. whenever z > 1
2α¯
. If the frequency of discriminators
is below this threshold, then both strategies earn zero payoff in reputation-
equilibrium. Along the edge-segment x = 0 and 0 ≤ z ≤ 1
2α¯
therefore defectors
and discriminators are indistinguishable.
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